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Abstract
Regulation by independent agencies, rather than ministries, is believed to result in better policy
outcomes. Yet this belief requires one to accept a complex causal chain leading from formal
independence to actual independence from politics, to policy decisions and, ultimately, to policy
outcomes. In this study, we analyze the link between the formal and actual independence of
regulatory agencies in Western Europe. New data on the appointment of chief executives of these
agencies is used to create a proxy for the actual independence of agencies from politics. The analysis
demonstrates that formal independence is an important determinant of actual independence, but
the rule of law and the number of veto players matter as well.
Keywords: independence, regulation, regulatory agency, rule of law, veto players.
1. Introduction
Politicians in Europe have granted considerable independence to regulatory agencies
because of the widespread belief that having more independent agencies results in better
policy outcomes. Scholars emphasize that independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) resolve
problems of time-inconsistent policy preferences which politicians face, thus producing
Pareto-improving regulatory decisions (cf. Kydland & Prescott 1977; Majone 1996).
Governments themselves indicate that the creation of IRAs has allowed “central minis-
tries to concentrate on policy-making,” resulting in “increased efficiency and innovation”
(OECD 2002, p. 21). However, for independence to lead to better policy outcomes, a
complex causal chain needs to operate, leading from statutory provisions granting inde-
pendence to behavioral patterns demonstrating independence, to policy decisions and,
ultimately, to policy outcomes.
We know much about the determinants of formal independence – the grant of
independence found in statutes (e.g. Gilardi 2002; Elgie & McMenamin 2005; Yesilkagit &
Christensen 2010). However, studies on the next link in the chain, connecting regulatory
agencies’ formal independence to their actual independence, have been less conclusive.1
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The natural presumption that higher degrees of formal independence also imply higher
degrees of actual independence has not yet been demonstrated convincingly. Here we test
this presumption, examining the relationship between the formal (de jure) and actual (de
facto) political independence of regulatory agencies. By the political independence of an
agency, we mean the degree to which the agency takes day-to-day decisions without the
interference of politicians – in terms of the offering of inducements or threats – and/or
the consideration of political preferences. While formal political independence refers to
the degree of independence from politics inherent in the legal instruments, which con-
stitute and govern the agency, actual political independence refers to the degree to which
the agency operates independently from politics in practice.
The study focuses on IRAs operating in seven sectors (competition, financial markets,
energy, telecoms, pharmaceuticals, food safety, the environment; Gilardi 2005a), in sev-
enteen Western European countries. As these countries are all established democracies,
with clear procedures for the delegation of authority to unelected bodies, the question of
how politicians deal with independent regulatory agencies is particularly significant. By
independent agencies, we mean bodies that possess public authority, but are not hierar-
chically subordinate to directly or indirectly elected politicians (cf. Thatcher & Stone
Sweet 2002, p. 2). Independent regulatory agencies are preoccupied with the creation of
rules, the evaluation and scrutiny of economic behavior, and the application of sanctions
for non-compliance.
We present two innovations in this study. First, we introduce new data on the
appointment of chief executives of Western European IRAs, using these to create a proxy
for the actual political independence of agencies. Second, we use a new measure of formal
independence which builds upon many of the same items as previous indices, but which
is constructed using a different method of aggregation. We then use these measures to
assess the impact of formal independence on actual independence, accounting for such
factors as the rule of law, political salience, coordination of the economy, and the number
of veto players in the polity.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we set out how formal indepen-
dence is hypothesized to affect actual independence. Subsequently, we introduce other
hypotheses, which have been discussed in prior literature. We then introduce our new
measures of formal and actual independence, and describe the operationalization of the
other variables. The importance of the different variables is then analyzed, followed by a
discussion of the results.
2. Formal and actual independence
In delegating to regulatory agencies, politicians not only decide on the competences of
these organizations, but also on the degree to which these competences can be exercised
independently from politics. The preferred degree of independence will be reflected in
statutory provisions on the appointment and removal of the head and board members,
the possibility for politicians to overrule the agency’s decisions, the legal status of the
organization, and its financial and organizational autonomy. The overall degree of formal
independence, which results from these provisions, is usually regarded as the main
determinant of the actual independence with which an agency exercises its competences.
Hence, politicians would only interfere in the business of regulatory agencies if the law
allowed them to do so.
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Politicians may, indeed, have good reasons to respect the formal independence of
regulatory agencies. First of all, they may be “affected” by the widespread belief that
having IRAs results in better policy outcomes. Regulatory agencies, which are insulated
from politics, would be better able to enhance the credibility of long-term policy com-
mitments (Majone 1996), and they would be able to develop higher levels of special-
ization and expertise (Bawn 1995; Vibert 2007). As a consequence, they would make
more efficient and effective regulatory decisions. For these desired outcomes to be
achieved, politicians would not only need to introduce statutory provisions for inde-
pendence, but they would also need to respect that independence in practice. Second,
the insulation of regulatory agencies from politics enables politicians to shift both the
responsibility and the eventual blame for regulatory decisions, to these organizations
(Fiorina 1982). Hence, by introducing and adhering to provisions for independence,
politicians can use the insulation of regulatory agencies as a blame-shifting instrument.
Third, politicians may respect the formal independence of regulatory agencies because
they find it inappropriate to interfere in the business of organizations, which have been
placed at arm’s length. And finally, even if politicians themselves do not consider inter-
fering in the business of independent agencies inappropriate, they may be concerned
about the negative reactions, which could follow from such actions. When having inde-
pendent regulatory agencies is the norm, politicians may fear being criticized for not
respecting regulators’ independence.
Yet the relation between formal and actual independence may not be that straight-
forward. First, the practice of the law may depart substantially from the text of the law,
making formal provisions unreliable indicators. The practice of the law may be more
beneficial for agency independence than the text of the law implies. For example, statu-
tory drafters in Commonwealth countries typically grant ministers broad discretionary
powers not intended to be used regularly by the minister, but allowing for ministerial
action in the event of unexpected scenarios (Thornton 1987, p. 275).2 In other countries,
it is more common for the practice of the law to be less beneficial for agency indepen-
dence, as politicians may be accustomed to ignoring onerous provisions.
Second, there may be important non-legal determinants of actual independence.
Carpenter (2001) traces the actual independence of US government agencies in the
Progressive Era back to successful bureaucratic practices of the “politics of legitimacy,”
consisting of building reputations for the agency and grounding these in broad and
diverse networks. Ringquist et al. (2003) conclude that political salience and policy com-
plexity are the main determinants of the propensity of legislators to intervene in regula-
tory decisions. Maggetti (2007) demonstrates that the actual independence of regulatory
agencies in ten Western European countries is determined by the age of the agencies,
membership of European networks, and the number of veto players in the polity. Egeberg
and Trondal (2009) find that Norwegian agencies pay less attention to political signals
than do ministerial departments, but other factors, such as political salience and task
discretion, also matter. Finally, studying Norwegian, Irish, and Flemish agencies, Verhoest
et al. (2010, pp. 249–269) conclude that the structural design of these organizations
matters for actual independence, but that other, non-legal factors, such as the country’s
politico-administrative tradition, the organization’s size, and its political salience, are also
important.
Admitting a role for non-legal determinants of independence does not mean that
formal independence is irrelevant. Though some studies do not find it to be an important
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determinant (Carpenter 2001; Maggetti 2007; Lægreid et al. 2008), and others present
mixed results (Yesilkagit & Van Thiel 2008), many scholars do trace actual independence
back to formal independence (Furlong 1998; Hayo & Voigt 2007; Egeberg & Trondal 2009;
Verhoest et al. 2010). Therefore, we expect that:
H1. IRAs with higher degrees of formal independence possess higher degrees of
actual independence.
3. Other potential explanatory factors
3.1. The rule of law
The specific statutory provisions of the legislation establishing a regulatory agency may
be less important than the general orientation of a society towards law itself. In particular,
we should expect societies, where the rule of law is more firmly established, to be societies
where agencies operate more independently from politics. One of the central components
of the rule of law is the presence of a judiciary which is independent of the executive of
the day, and which can defend citizens’ legally guaranteed rights against those who
transgress them – including the executive. IRAs are not judicial bodies, but they often act
in a quasi-judicial fashion. Consequently, we might expect that in countries where judi-
cial bodies’ decisions are respected, decisions of other independent bodies acting in a
quasi-judicial fashion will also be respected, and, thus, IRAs will enjoy actual indepen-
dence. In other words, in countries where the rule of law is well established, IRAs may
benefit from a displaced tolerance of independent institutions acting in a judicial manner.
We therefore hypothesize that:
H2. The more firmly the rule of law is established in a country, the higher the degree
of actual independence of IRAs.
3.2. Veto players
Actions taken by politicians to reward or sanction regulators may often require the
agreement of multiple actors. This may be because the action in question requires the
formal passage of an act in parliament, and because no single party has a majority or
because the action in question can be taken by the executive or an individual ministry, but
cabinet and intra-ministry decisionmaking procedures require agreement between coa-
lition members in order to prevent the coalition from breaking down. The more veto
players – actors whose agreement is necessary for an action to be taken (Tsebelis 1995, p.
293) – the more difficult it will be for politicians to sanction or reward the regulator
through legislative or executive measures. The more difficult it is for politicians to
sanction or reward, the more independent the regulator will be in practice (cf. Maggetti
2007). Consequently, we expect that:
H3. The more veto players in a polity, the higher the degree of actual independence
of IRAs.
3.3. Political salience
As politicians have only limited time and resources, they will pay more attention to some
agencies than to others, and they will also prioritize controlling some agencies rather than
others (Calvert et al. 1989, pp. 589–590). Political salience plays an important role in the
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process of prioritization, and is an important determinant of political efforts to control
the behavior of agencies (Dudley 1994; Ringquist et al. 2003). As Calvert et al. (1989, p.
590) explain, “in those areas in which they care the most, politicians will expend greater
effort and resources in reducing the uncertainty that affords bureaucrats the opportunity
for discretion.” Hence, we propose:
H4. The greater the salience of the policy area covered by the regulatory agency, the
lower the degree of actual independence of IRAs.
3.4. Coordination of the economy
As coordinated market economies (CMEs) are characterized by extensive networks
linking business and governments, and as these networks are usually taken to be inimical
to independent policymaking, we may expect regulatory agencies to be less independent
in such systems. As the networks in CMEs primarily coordinate firms, and only second-
arily link business to government, they need not play a role for semi-detached parts of
government. Nonetheless, Maggetti (2007, p. 274) has hypothesized that CMEs will have
less independent regulatory agencies. In the same study, however, not only was this
hypothesis not confirmed, but also the link ran precisely in the opposite direction. One
explanation is that while the types of networks found in CMEs are inimical to indepen-
dence simpliciter, they are particularly harmful to independence from regulatees; but
dependence on regulatees may bolster independence vis-à-vis politicians. “An agency
cannot be a servant of two masters: if it is scarcely independent from the politicians, it
should be highly independent from those being regulated” (Maggetti 2007, p. 281).
Hence:
H5. The more coordinated the market economy in a country, the higher the degree
of actual independence of IRAs.
4. Operationalization
4.1. Measurement of actual independence
Before discussing how to operationalize the actual independence of regulatory agencies
from politicians, it is worth setting out what our operationalization attempts to measure,
and why it is different from some other literature on this subject. Our root concept,
independence from politics, is narrowly drawn. We define political independence of an
agency as the degree to which that agency takes day-to-day decisions without the inter-
ference of politicians – in terms of the offering of inducements or threats – and/or the
consideration of political preferences.3 Formal political independence refers to the degree
of independence from politics inherent in those legal instruments which constitute and
govern the agency. Actual political independence, on the other hand, refers to the degree
to which the agency, in practice, makes its decisions independently from politics. We
consider the scope of the powers of an agency – an element that is often included in
measures of independence – a separate feature of agencies (Hanretty & Koop 2012). A
second important point is that we consider independence from politicians to be unidi-
mensional in practice, even if for analytical purposes it may be helpful to distinguish
aspects of independence, such as financial independence, managerial independence, and
so on.4 This does not exhaust the idea of agency independence: agency independence
from regulatees, as opposed to politicians, is a classic area of study, and it may be that
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these two types of independence form part of a multidimensional schema. Focusing
exclusively on independence from politics, we stick to measurement in one dimension.
Even restricting ourselves to one dimension, precise measurement of actual indepen-
dence of regulatory agencies is extremely difficult. While it is possible (see Maggetti
2007), it is exceedingly complex to produce comparable measures for enough agencies to
permit statistical analysis. We therefore rely on two proxy measures of independence,
which have been developed in the literature on central bank independence (Cukierman
et al. 1992; Cukierman & Webb 1995): a measure of political vulnerability (VUL), and a
measure of the average turnover of the chief executive of the agency (TOR). Our political
vulnerability proxy, VUL, is the percentage of government changes followed within six
months by a change in the agency chief executive.5 Our turnover proxy, TOR, is the
reciprocal of the average tenure, in years, of chief executives of an agency. These two proxy
measures have a long history of application in the literature on central bank indepen-
dence (Sturm & De Haan 2001; Keefer & Stasavage 2003; Dreher et al. 2008), and are now
being applied to the independence of regulatory agencies (Montoya & Trillas 2009;
Jordana & Ramió 2010) and public broadcasters (Hanretty 2010). Elements of these
proxies – in particular turnover – have also been applied to other non-majoritarian
institutions, such as supreme courts (Hayo & Voigt 2007). Hanretty explains the logic
behind VUL as follows:
If, following a new government, there is a change in the chief executive, then either
the chief executive reached the end of her term, or left early. If she reached the end
of her term, it may be that the terms of chief executives are designed so as to coincide
with changes in government. . . . If this is the case, then one may assume that the
chief executive is, in some sense, the expression of a government choice. If the terms
do not coincide by design, then the fact that they did so may create this impression
in any case. If, by contrast, the chief executive left early, she was either constrained
to resign, or did so of her own accord. If she was constrained to resign, this may
represent the introduction of some new constraint connected to the government. If
she left of her own accord, this may reflect a belief that the government should have
a ‘clean slate’ to influence the forthcoming selection of a chief executive (2010, p.
77).
Figure 1 plots a histogram of gaps between government formation and agency head
termination. The six-month window is indicated by the solid vertical line.6
The logic behind TOR is less rigorous. Rates of turnover reflect multiple influences:
the attractiveness of exit options, the average age at which executives are appointed, or
country- or sector-specific expectations about when to call time on a career in regulation.
For our purposes, one important influence on higher rates of turnover is political
(dis)satisfaction with the chief executive. While dissatisfaction may result from non-
partisan considerations, such as the quality of chief executives, it may also result from
chief executives not following the wishes of their political principals. Given such dissat-
isfaction, politicians may either dismiss the chief executive, or decline to re-appoint her.
Or, anticipating this, the chief executive may resign or refuse to be considered for
re-appointment. Given our earlier definition of actual independence, such a situation
would indicate low levels of independence. The converse scenario, of low rates of turn-
over, may either reflect high levels of independence, or continued political satisfaction
with the current chief executive, which results from subservient behavior. In theory, this
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poses a problem of observational equivalence. To use TOR as a proxy measure, we must,
therefore, make two assumptions: first, that non-political factors affecting turnover are
unrelated to political factors affecting turnover, and, thus, do not systematically bias the
use of turnover as a proxy for independence; and second, that low rates of turnover are,
ceteris paribus, always a sign of high degrees of independence, rather than deferential chief
executives.
These are strong assumptions, but we believe they are warranted in the cases we study.
In particular, our measure is highly correlated with other measures, which are expressed
in terms of early exit, rather than turnover. Maggetti (2007) uses as a measure of actual
independence the percentage of executives who left before two-thirds of their stated term
had expired. Our measure is highly correlated with his measure (Pearson’s r = 0.67). The
strong correlation between our measure, and measures expressed in terms of early exit,
would be unlikely if our measure was tapping, for instance, national variation in executive
longevity, rather than national and sectoral variation in political independence.7
Whilst concerns about observational equivalence have a sound basis, this concern has
typically been dealt with by noting the paucity of long-serving chief executives. Following
Cukierman (1992, p. 385) in examining executives who have served terms of 12 years or
more (three times the modal legislative term), there are only 26 such executives, 18 of
whom served agencies with scores of zero for VUL, and which are, therefore, unlikely to
have been subservient. The biographies of the remaining executives do not at all suggest
subservience. Jens Kampmann, head of the Danish environmental regulator (TOR = 0.18;
VUL = 0.13) between 1978 and 1990, was a former Social Democrat, and was unlikely to
have been subservient to the Conservative-led Schlüter governments of 1982–1993.
Another environmental regulator, Valfrid Paulsson, is the longest serving chief executive
in our sample, and was the first director-general of the Swedish Naturvårdsverket (TOR =
0.07; VUL = 0). Though he began his career under the Social Democrats, he was “no
political appointee” (Sjö 2006), and never acted as a “government rubber stamp”
(Hennéus 2006). Rather, he protested (successfully) against the Palme government’s plans
to dam a river, and later served under two conservative governments. Finally, Sir Gordon
Borrie was head of the UK Office of Fair Trading (TOR = 0.16, VUL = 0.25) for sixteen
years, which might suggest subservience. Yet, following his long period under Conserva-
tive government, he was nominated to the House of Lords to sit as a Labour peer, hardly
likely if Borrie had slavishly followed the Conservative wishes while in office.
Figure 1 Appointment timing following government change.1bs_bs_query
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Turnover rates are more closely related to some statutory provisions for indepen-
dence than to others. In particular, they are linked to appointment and dismissal pro-
cedures. We believe though, that this is not a problem for our analysis. Our starting
point has been that institutional design does not always translate into institutional
practice. Indeed, we have come across numerous examples of chief executives who left
their agency before the end of their term, suggesting that there is a gap between formal
and actual term length. Furthermore, as will be discussed later, only a few of the indi-
cators of formal independence are related to the appointment and dismissal of chief
executives. Hence, an empirical link between formal and actual independence is
unlikely to be the consequence of a straightforward link between provisions for turn-
over and turnover practices.
By combining these two proxies, we can mitigate the error found in each. The two
measures are only weakly correlated (Spearman’s ρ = 0.33), but this is largely because
of a number of cases where VUL is stuck at zero, sometimes because of a limited
number of government changes.8 We scaled the two measures to have zero mean and
unit standard deviation, and then averaged them and subtracted the result from one in
order to give a measure of independence (since independence increases as TOR and
VUL decrease). To calculate TOR and VUL, we gathered data on the tenure of 321 chief
executives of 87 IRAs in Europe, using information from press releases from agencies
and governments, and from newspaper searches using Lexis-Nexis.9 Where information
on the day or month of appointment was missing, we imputed the first day of the
month, and January. Since the inclusion of recently appointed chief executives might
unfairly bias TOR downwards, we included currently-serving chief executives’ tenure in
the calculation of TOR, only if TOR would not decrease as a result. Figure 2 plots
values of our measure by country and by sector; countries are plotted in ascending
order of mean actual independence; sectors are plotted left to right in increasing order
of mean actual independence.
We demonstrate our measure with a number of representative examples of situa-
tions in which chief executives have been replaced for political reasons. The first set of
examples is related to situations where the chief executive has been replaced following
a change of government, and largely concerns VUL. This was the case for the Greek
financial markets regulator, the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission. While only one
of the five government changes during the period resulted in a change in the chief
executive of the regulator, the change was drastic: following the March 2004 general
election and the formation of Karamanlis’ first government, the entire board of the
regulator was replaced, and a new chief executive, Alexis Pilavios, was appointed.
Shortly after, the chief executive under the PASOK governments, Stavros Thomadakis
(who was married to a minister in the Simitis government), was prosecuted for negli-
gence (Athens Newswire 2004). Above-average rates of turnover corroborate the
impression of a low-independence regulator.
The second set of examples comes from situations where the chief executive has been
dismissed by government at any point, thereby affecting TOR. There are relatively few
examples of clear-cut dismissal: most chief executives tend to jump before they are
pushed. The example just given, of the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission, is an
example that affects both VUL and TOR.
It is far more common for chief executives to resign for political reasons: such cases
form our third set of examples. These cases are relatively common, and are by no means
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confined to those countries that have a generally poor record for independence, such as
Greece. The director-general of the Norwegian financial markets authority, Svein
Aasmundstad, left his post in May 1992 after a dispute with the agency board and the
Ministry of Finance; his successor was only appointed after parliament re-affirmed the
agency’s position as “an independent and strengthened organisation for financial super-
vision.”10 A similar politically-inspired resignation took place in the Danish environment
agency two years after the formation of a center-right government that was viewed by the
then-director-general, Steen Gade, as wishing to starve funding for the environment
(Kristeligt Dagblad 2003).
By far the largest set of examples comes from cases where the government chose not
to re-appoint an outgoing chief executive because it wished to impose its own political
direction on the agency. This is one way in which low political independence translates
Figure 2 Actual independence by country and by sector.1bs_bs_query
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into higher executive turnover, though the effect is rather indiscriminate. It is also the
most openly discussed way. There was a slew of non-reappointments following Labour’s
return to government in 1997 – re-appointments which only arose three years later.
Commenting on the non-reappointment of Kevin Bridgeman as head of the Office of
Fair Trading, Brown (2000) reported that:
Few quibble with ministers’ desire to replace a Conservative appointee with their
own man. There is also some sympathy for suggestions that Mr Bridgeman was not
up to the job (though others disagree). But many observers – including some other
regulators – are unhappy about the way Mr Bridgeman was undermined by a
whispering campaign. This was apparently endorsed by ministers, though not by Mr
Byers [the minister responsible]. The real reason they got rid of him, some say, is
that he was robust enough to refuse politically inspired demands for inquiries into
sectors where there was no evidence of anti-competitive practices.
A similar story took place in Portugal, where the government decided not to reap-
point competition authority chairman Abel Mateus after Mateus lost support from
President Cavaco Silva, and after Mateus rowed with ministers over his aggressive anti-
trust measures aimed at former state-owned utilities (Thomson Financial News 2007).
Not all cases of resignation, still less of non-reappointment, indicate low levels of actual
independence, nor would we claim as much. Rather, by offering these examples we
demonstrate how low levels of political independence can affect the values of our proxy
measures, and that we can, therefore, use information about turnover rates and replace-
ments, following government change, as proxies for independence.
4.2. Measurement of formal independence
Measures of formal independence have been proposed for central banks, supreme courts,
and regulatory agencies. Most of these measures share a large number of index items
which relate to the method by which members of the board or court are appointed; their
tenure in office; the provisions for their dismissal; and the relationship between the
organization and the legislature and the executive, respectively, in particular, concerning
the reporting requirements faced by the organization. The most important index of
formal independence for our purposes is the index created by Gilardi (2002, 2005a),
which, in turn, incorporates many index items found in earlier work on central bank
independence by Cukierman et al. (1992). A list of these items, and the response catego-
ries for each item, is found in Table 1.
There are, however, some issues with the items and the scoring used in the Gilardi
index that prevent it from being used directly. In a previous article, we have argued that
this index, and others like it, suffer from at least three problems: they assume an order for
certain response categories which is only weakly justified, or not at all; they weigh items
according to criteria that are either arbitrary or are based on rational ignorance about the
contribution of each item; and they assume that response categories are scale variables
(and not just ordinal categories). To deal with these problems, we developed a latent trait
model of formal independence. This latent trait model can also be described as a type of
factor analysis for ordinal, rather than interval, level data. This latent trait model allowed
us to test: (a) which item response categories were poorly ordered; (b) which items did
not fit the latent trait at all (which was often a result of poor ordering); (c) the contri-
bution made by each item, in terms of its ability to discriminate with respect to the latent
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Table 1 Formal independence items, adapted from Gilardi (2002)
Item Response category b
If the head has a fixed term, how long is it? Fixed < 4 years  4 years  5 years  6 years 
Over 6 years
0.55
Does the head of the agency serve for a fixed
term?
No/Discretionary  Yes
1.16
Can the head of the agency be dismissed? Can be dismissed for a variety of reasons  Can
be dismissed, but only for reasons unrelated
to policy  Cannot be dismissed
0.58
Are there provisions for dismissal of the head? No  Yes 0.16
May the head of the agency hold other offices in
the public administration?
Yes  Yes, but only with permission of the
executive branch  No 1.52
Are there provisions for the head holding other
offices?
No  Yes
1.38
Is the appointment of the agency head
renewable?
Yes, more than once  Yes, once  No
1.06
Is independence a formal requirement for the
appointment?
No  Yes
0.96
If the board members have a fixed term, how
long is it?
Fixed < 4 years  4 years  5 years  6 years 
Over 6 years 1
Do board members serve for a fixed term? No/Discretionary  Yes 1.06
Can board members be dismissed? Can be dismissed for a variety of reasons  Can
be dismissed, but only for reasons unrelated
to policy  Cannot be dismissed
0.50
Are there provisions for dismissal of the board? No  Yes 0.35
May board members hold other offices in the
public administration?
Yes  Yes, but only with permission of the
executive branch  No 1.25
Are there provisions for board members holding
other offices?
No  Yes
1.42
Is the appointment of the board members
renewable?
Yes, more than once  Yes, once  No
1.35
Is independence a formal requirement for the
appointment?
No  Yes
1.17
Is the independence of the agency formally
stated in legislation or in statute?
No  Yes
1.09
What are the agency’s formal obligations to the
executive?
Agency must present reports more than once a
year for approval  Agency must present an
annual report which must be approved 
Agency must present an annual report for
information only  No formal reporting
obligations
0.36
What is the source of the agency’s funding? Government grants only  Fees levied on the
regulated industry and government grants 
Fees levied on the regulated industry
0.13
How is the agency’s budget controlled? By the executive and/or the legislature  By an
accounting office, court or non-elected body
 By the agency only
0.16
Which body decides upon the agency’s internal
organization?
The executive only  Both the agency and the
executive  The agency only 0.48
Which body is in charge of the agency’s
personnel policy?
The executive only  Both the agency and the
executive  The agency only 0.13
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trait; and (d) the distance (in terms of the latent trait) between each response category
within an item. We found that four items – the agency’s reporting requirements to the
legislature; whether or not the agency had exclusive competence; and the appointment
method used for the head of the agency and the agency board – were either unrelated to
the latent trait of formal independence or were poorly ordered. We, therefore, dropped
these items to calculate the trait scores for formal independence for each agency, using
data from a wide range of agencies in Europe and in the rest of the world. In this paper,
we use the same data gathered by Gilardi (2005a), but we calculate the degree of formal
independence by using (a) the items that performed as expected, and (b) the parameter
estimates we obtained from our previous model. Note that using slightly older data may
exert a downwards bias on the effect of formal independence if there has been a general
increase in the formal independence of agencies. The items and their discrimination
parameters – which are analogous to weights in a normal index – are reported in
Table 1.11
4.3. Measurement of the other independent variables
Let us now turn to the operationalization of the remaining variables. First of all, there are
a variety of measures of the rule of law; one review noted at least seven (Skaaning 2010).
Of these seven, only three measures – the PRS Group’s Law and Order measure, the
Freedom House measure of Rule of Law, and the World Bank’s composite index of Rule
of Law, released as part of their Governance Matters indicators – cover all of the countries
we analyze. We discarded the measure from the PRS group, as it is not publicly available
and, thus, causes problems for replication. We have not used the Freedom House measure
for the reason that there is no information available on coder reliability and on whether
respondents in different countries have interpreted the questions similarly. The remain-
ing measure – the World Bank measure – aggregates information from 77 other indica-
tors from 31 different sources. In the belief that aggregating multiple measures can reduce
the error in each, we use the World Bank measure of the rule of law in the analysis
(Kaufmann et al. 2009).12
The hypothesis on the number of veto players was tested using the number of veto
players as calculated following Tsebelis (1995, pp. 305–308). A major part of the data was
taken directly from Tsebelis’ website.13 The remainder were calculated manually. We
averaged these figures out over the period of the agency’s lifetime.14 To assess the effect of
political salience, we used data gathered by Laver and Hunt (1992). These authors report
salience scores for ministerial portfolios in established democracies. For each regulatory
agency, we took the score of the ministry to which the agency is linked. For Switzerland,
which was not included in the Laver and Hunt study, we imputed the scores for Austria
for the reason that the two countries are rather similar in terms of size and political
system.15 Finally, to test the hypothesis on coordination of the economy, we used data by
Hall and Gingerich (2009). Two of our countries are not included in the dataset of these
authors. Based on their corporatism scores (Siaroff 1999), we ascribed Greece a value
halfway between the United Kingdom and the United States, and Luxembourg the same
value as Belgium. We view these theoretically driven imputations as better than mean
imputation or other multiple imputation strategies.
We control for the effect of country size and real gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita. We control for country size because of the more exposed position of regulators in
smaller states. Small states spend a disproportionate amount of their national product on
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public services, both because of fixed costs in public service provision and because of
increased electoral pressure in smaller states (Remmer 2010). As a result, the role of the
state in small states may be overwhelming, and “such state ubiquity . . . can foster nepo-
tism, cronyism, patronage, and political clientelism,” as opponents and supporters are
more easily identified and (proportionally) more easily rewarded (Srebrnik 2004, pp.
334–335). Each of these practices is inimical to independence. Finally, we control for real
GDP per capita to test for differences between richer and poorer economies.16 The
summary statistics for the different variables are reported in Table 2.
5. Analysis
We carried out a multilevel regression analysis on the 87 regulatory agencies for which we
had data on formal and actual independence, with varying country-intercepts. We opted
for a multilevel model rather than an ordinary least squares regression because there is a
hierarchical structure in the data: regulators are nested within countries, and so are not
independent of each other. The results of our models are shown in Table 3.17 The table
shows six models with three different dependent variables: our measure of independence,
and the component parts of that measure, TOR and VUL. Note that variables which
increase actual independence should have a positive sign in the first two columns, but a
negative sign in the third to sixth columns, since higher TOR, and higher political VUL,
mean less independence.18
The first model for each dependent variable is the full model with all predictors
included: this model is somewhat overspecified. The second model for each variable is a
reduced model, which shows a number of significant variables. This reduced model is
necessary to reduce the risk of a saturated model. As the table shows, each of the models
perform moderately well in explaining variation in our measure of independence, with
the two models explaining actual independence performing better than those explaining
turnover or political vulnerability. Formal independence, contra skeptical predictions,
turned out to be a significant predictor of actual independence. This was true in all
models, though in the models for executive TOR, formal independence was only signifi-
cant at 10 percent. The independent effect of rule of law itself was far more important,
substantively and statistically, being significant at the 0.05 level in all of the six models,
and affecting actual independence in the hypothesized way.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
De facto independence 1 0.82 -2.03 1.88
TOR 0.19 0.12 0.05 0.73
VUL 0.09 0.14 0 0.66
Formal independence 0.45 0.22 0 0.99
Rule of law (1998–2008) 1.56 0.40 0.62 1.94
Number of veto players 2.63 1.40 1 6.13
Political salience 5.6 3.20 1 13.5
Coordination 0.62 0.26 0.06 1
Population (’000) 24,150 25,800 447 82,240
GDP per capita 28,210 7,071 17,610 59,440
GDP, gross domestic product; VUL, vulnerability; TOR, turnover.
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Our political system variable – the number of veto players – was significant, and in the
expected direction. Hence, a larger number of veto players make it more difficult to
sanction the agency, and thus make it more independent. No support for this is found,
however, in the model of executive TOR. The salience of the policy area in which each
agency operates was not statistically significant in any model. The same is true of the
degree of coordination in the market economy, which does not increase degrees of actual
independence. Although the degree of coordination is associated with longer-lasting chief
executives in our model of TOR, there is no sign of any effect on political vulnerability or
on the aggregate measure.
Finally, the control variable for country size, in terms of population, does have an
effect on actual independence: increases in population are associated with higher degrees
of actual independence. This supports the argument that the omnipresence of the state in
smaller countries leads to closer ties between politicians and regulators. This finding may,
however, be artefactual – a model that includes our three favored variables (veto players,
rule of law, and formal independence), together with country size, has country intercepts
that are all equal to zero, suggesting a saturated model.
We can go beyond hypothesis testing to examine the substantive impact of each of
these variables. Figure 3 shows the effect on actual independence of a change in one
standard deviation of each variable. We can see that a one standard deviation change in
formal independence increases actual independence by around 0.2, more than compa-
rable changes in the number of veto players or population. Still, the substantive effect of
changes in formal independence is only modest. Thus, incorporating more provisions for
independence in the statutes of regulatory agencies should not be expected to lead to
major changes in actual independence. A one standard deviation change in the rule of law
– about the difference between Spain and the United Kingdom – has by far the largest
effect.19 Nevertheless, formal independence is by far more tractable than making changes
in the rule of law. That is, while legislators can increase the formal independence of a
regulatory agency by changing the statutes of the organization, there is no such “simple”
solution for improving the rule of law.
The substantive importance of formal independence becomes even clearer when we
consider concrete examples of the changes in each variable that are necessary to secure a
desired change in actual independence. Returning to the Greek financial markets regu-
lator, suppose that we wished to make the Greek regulator as independent from politics
as the German regulator, BaFin. To achieve this change – a change of almost 2.25 units on
Figure 3 Effects on actual independence of standard deviation change in independent variables.1bs_bs_query
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our measure – how would our key variables need to change? No single change in a
variable can achieve an effect of this magnitude. To surpass the level of actual indepen-
dence shown by the BaFin, Greece would need to become as law-abiding as Norway, and
grant the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission the third-highest degree of formal inde-
pendence seen in our sample. The first of these changes seems difficult to achieve; the
second is possible, but would not secure such a dramatic improvement alone.
6. Conclusion and discussion
So far, we have shown that we can arrive at reasonable interval-level measures of the
actual independence of regulatory agencies, and that the independence of these agen-
cies can be explained reasonably well by four main variables – the degree of formal
independence of the agency, the rule of law, the size of a country, and the number of
veto players. These findings can, of course, be contested, and we recognize that not all
readers will be convinced by our use of proxies and the assumptions that the effects of
these variables are ever-present and monotonically increasing. Our data refers to inde-
pendence over the life of these agencies, which presents both benefits and challenges: as
these institutions age, they acquire a longer track record which is a more reliable indi-
cator of their degree of independence. At the same time, however, static measurements
of independence may belie the extent to which independence varies over time in
response to developments, which are internal or external to the agency (and which may
also explain why our findings differ from other scholars who find no link between
formal and actual independence).
Although our study has been limited to IRAs in 17 established Western European
democracies, we expect our findings to be relevant for other established democracies as
well. Moreover, given the importance of the rule of law for actual independence, we
believe that our findings also have considerable relevance for regulators operating in
newer democracies where the rule of law is less well established. Jordana and Ramió
(2010) have demonstrated, on the basis of proxy measures related to turnover, that
regulatory agencies in Latin America are, on average, less independent than regulators in
Western Europe. The gap between Latin American regulators and Western European ones
is consistent with the difference in the rule of law between the two regions. In other
words, although the dynamics of independence may be different in newer democracies,
we expect the rule of law to be an important explanatory factor of the variation in actual
independence in these countries as well.
Our findings on the effect sizes of each of these variables imply an optimistic view for
institutional engineering. Olsen (2003) has written that institutional engineering requires
that decisionmakers know what they want, know how to achieve it, and have the power
to do what is needed to achieve a desired result. We cannot speak to politicians’ desires
and preferences, though the benefits of agency independence – whether extrinsically, in
terms of greater efficiency, or intrinsically, in terms of greater propriety – are usually
taken to self-recommending. Nor still can we speak to whether politicians have the power
necessary to achieve changes in agency’s formal independence – though here, too, the tide
seems to flow inexorably in the direction of greater independence (Gilardi 2005b). But we
do suggest that our findings offer knowledge about how to achieve the desired outcome,
which is relatively independent of contextual features – like limited rule of law – that
might make engineering more difficult.
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Notes
1 Studies on the link between independence and better policy outcomes – mainly in the area of
central banking – have also been inconclusive (Cukierman et al. 1992; Alesina & Summers
1993; Down 2004).
2 With only two common law countries in the analysis – Ireland and the United Kingdom – we
cannot disentangle the impact of such a system from the effect of other institutional features
associated with the two countries, such as the administrative traditions they share.
3 Our definition of independence resembles definitions of autonomy. Verhoest et al., for
instance, define agency autonomy as “the extent to which an agency can decide itself about
matters that it considers important” (2010, p. 18–19), and Busuioc et al. indicate that agents
have autonomy “when they have the capacity to manage their own affairs, acting and deciding
unbound by the preferences and interests of their principals” (Busuioc et al. 2011, p. 850). Yet,
for some authors, independence is more narrowly defined. Olsen, for example, defines
autonomy as “both the absence of external interference and the capability of an agency or
institution to exploit available spaces to manoeuvre” (Olsen 2009, p. 442).
4 More specifically, we consider independence from politics to be a latent trait which affects the
probability that agency decisions in different areas – financial decisions, management
decisions, and so on – are made without the interference of politicians and/or the
consideration of political preferences.
5 Following Strøm et al. (2010), we judge a new government to have started if there has been an
election, a change in the prime minister or a change in the partisan composition of the
government.
6 We also ran the models with time windows of nine and 12 months. The results of these models
are largely similar to the ones presented in Table 3, but the P-values of the coefficients for
formal independence are slightly higher than 0.10. This is also the case for the P-value of the
coefficient for population in the model with the 12-month window. We present the results of
the alternative models in the on-line appendix.
7 Note, however, that national average levels of chief executive turnover (DeFond & Hung 2004)
are not significantly correlated with TOR (Pearson’s r = -0.08).
8 The correlation between TOR and VUL is higher for cases where VUL is greater than zero:
Pearson’s r = 0.56.
9 In most cases, we have information from the founding of the agency until the present day. In
the online appendix, we have included the list of regulatory agencies and the period for which
we have data on the chief executives of these agencies.
10 Personal communication from Bjørn Skogstad Aamo, director-general, Finanstilsyn.
11 We also estimated the final OLS model using the original Gilardi scores instead of our latent
trait scores. The same variables are significant in both specifications. The results with the
alternative measure are reported in the online appendix.
12 We also ran the analyses with the Freedom House measure; results do not differ substantially.
See the online appendix.
13 See http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/veto_players_data (last accessed 22 June 2012).
14 We re-ran the models with measures for actual independence, veto players, population, and
GDP per capita, which are averaged over a shorter period of time, using a maximum of 20
years (1990–2010). These models also served to, at least partially, deal with the issue of changes
in the statutory provisions for independence. Quite a number of IRA statutes have been
changed in the 1990s, in which case the impact of formal independence is better captured
using the adjusted measure of actual independence. The results of these models are similar to
those presented in Table 3, with the exception of the effect of the population variable in the
first model, which is no longer significant. The results of the models are presented in the
on-line appendix.
1bs_bs_query
2bs_bs_query
3bs_bs_query
4bs_bs_query
5bs_bs_query
6bs_bs_query
7bs_bs_query
8bs_bs_query
9bs_bs_query
10bs_bs_query
11bs_bs_query
12bs_bs_query
13bs_bs_query
14bs_bs_query
15bs_bs_query
16bs_bs_query
17bs_bs_query
18bs_bs_query
19bs_bs_query
20bs_bs_query
21bs_bs_query
22bs_bs_query
23bs_bs_query
24bs_bs_query
25bs_bs_query
26bs_bs_query
27bs_bs_query
28bs_bs_query
29bs_bs_query
30bs_bs_query
31bs_bs_query
32bs_bs_query
33bs_bs_query
34bs_bs_query
35bs_bs_query
36bs_bs_query
37bs_bs_query
38bs_bs_query
39bs_bs_query
40bs_bs_query
41bs_bs_query
42bs_bs_query
43bs_bs_query
44bs_bs_query
45bs_bs_query
46bs_bs_query
47bs_bs_query
48bs_bs_query
49bs_bs_query
50bs_bs_query
51bs_bs_query
Formal and actual independence of agencies C. Hanretty and C. Koop
© 2012 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 17
3
bs_bs_query
4
bs_bs_query
5
bs_bs_query
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 18 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 17 18:44:23 2012
/v2503/blackwell/journals/rego_v0_i0/rego_1156
15 We also ran the analyses with the Druckman and Warwick (2005) measure of portfolio
salience, which excludes Greece and the UK. The results – which do not differ substantially –
are in the online appendix.
16 Following Maggetti (2007), we initially tested for agency age. It does not appear here because
it was not a significant predictor of actual independence, and because our cross-sectional data
does not allow a proper test of the dynamic effects of agency age.
17 In the online appendix, we report the results from OLS regression with Huber-White standard
errors clustered by country. All variables significant in our multilevel models are also
significant in these models.
18 The correlation between formal independence and the three measures of actual independence
is not very strong: for the aggregate measure, Pearson’s r = 0.03; for TOR, Pearson’s r = 0.03;
and for VUL, Pearson’s r = -0.08.
19 Findings are similar for the TOR and VUL models. In the online appendix, we include the
figures with the effect on these variables of a change in one standard deviation of the three
independent variables.
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